Per Terram Per Mare
What Can Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Tell Us About China's Threat to Taiwan?
Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine almost nine months ago has led many to reevaluate their thinking around large-scale conventional conflict. Major wars are no longer so inconceivable. But just as the risks of war are becoming apparent, so too are some of the capabilities and shortcomings of certain weapons platforms previously masked by the fog of peace. Naturally, these revelations have led many to draw parallels and distinctions between Ukraine’s resistance and other states’ military efforts, either retrospectively (Afghan National Army) or prospectively (ROC Armed Forces). The case of Taiwan is perhaps the most interesting of the bunch, however, because in many ways it seems to represent the most likely scenario for future large-scale conventional fighting, and thus lends itself to (sometimes too) easy comparison with the ongoing war in Ukraine. In keeping with my attempt to write shorter posts for the next few weeks, I’ve decided to organize this post simply as a bunch of detailed bullet points. But if you’re wanting more, never fear! I’m currently working on a much more thorough campaign analysis of a China-Taiwan conflict, which will be published sometime in the next few months.
Economic Considerations
Whereas Ukraine is primarily an exporter of agricultural commodities (these comprise 41% of its exports), Taiwan specializes in advanced manufactures. Indeed, Taiwan controls quite a large market share of manufactures (these comprise 51.4% of its exports) for its size and also possesses a near monopoly over advanced chip manufacturing. Thus, whereas Ukraine’s primary export destinations are located in developing countries (and Russian allies) that import grain and other agricultural imports, Taiwan’s main export destinations (excluding China, which accounts for 25.2% of total trade) are the major developed economies of the US, EU, Japan, and Korea. It’s not immediately obvious what the implications of this are, especially since Taiwan’s exports represent only a small percentage of these developed economies’ overall import mix. But it does suggest that a Chinese blockade or invasion would produce market disruptions to key sectors in major developed economies in a far more broad-based way than what has happened from the Ukraine War, which has mostly been limited to European, rather than global, energy markets. On the margin, at least, this would seem to make the risks of diplomatic and economic blowback higher for China.
Relatedly, China is far more integrated into Western trade networks than Russia. On the one hand, this grants the West quite a bit of leverage, as Beijing is totally reliant on access to European and American consumer markets to offload its manufactures. More importantly, it has no alternative export destinations that could come even remotely close to filling in, which was evidenced during the Trump trade war. Not only do Western powers have leverage as export markets; they also serve as the point of origin for 55% of Chinese intermediate inputs, meaning that sanctions could cripple the Chinese economy on both the demand and supply side. Chinese reliance on Western intermediate inputs also suggests that we would have significant advanced warning of a Chinese attack, as Beijing would likely start aggressively stockpiling these inputs months, or even years, in advance. On the other hand, this economic exposure cuts both ways, and Western economies are themselves immensely dependent on the Chinese market both as a source of cheap imports but also as an enormous export market for products such as German automobiles and American commercial airliners. This Western dependence raises questions about countries’ (esp. European) willingness to impose long-term sanctions.
Speaking of stockpiling and agricultural commodities, Taiwan is extremely dependent on food imports to feed its population. This renders the island incredibly vulnerable to blockade, as it would literally starve within a matter of months, if not weeks. In the event of an impending conflict, therefore, Taiwan would need to begin stockpiling basic food supplies in significant quantities as quickly as possible. Resupplying the island during high-intensity combat operations around its littorals would be extremely challenging, and it is highly unlikely that the island would receive anywhere near the level of foodstuffs that would be required absent significant prior preparation.
Geopolitical Considerations
In contrast to the multilateral NATO alliance, the US alliance system in Asia is based on a series of bilateral “hub and spokes” alliances. On the one hand, this arguably enhances flexibility by allowing the US to coordinate with individual allies and avoid the numerous veto points that exist within a multilateral framework. On the other hand, the lack of a large, institutionalized alliance network could hinder the coordination of strategy, aid, and delivery of materiel. Moreover, unlike Europe, which has immense military logistical capacity as a byproduct of decades of Cold War investment, America’s Asian allies have, until recently, largely neglected to invest in similarly robust logistical infrastructure, potentially impairing their ability to quickly move military equipment and munitions to Taiwan.
Taiwan is also in a more precarious geographic position because, unlike Ukraine, it does not share any land borders with friendly countries through which military support could flow. Instead, its insular status means that, were China to win sea control around Taiwan, it would be almost impossible to provide the ROC with ongoing materiel support unless the US and its allies were willing to fight their way in.
Taiwan’s unique political status is also far more complex than Ukraine’s, which is based on internationally recognized borders. Taiwan is, of course, a de facto independent country. But the nature of the One China Policy means that countries have an easy excuse to avoid supporting Taiwan, as they can simply declare the matter to be a domestic issue and therefore outside their purview. Given how willfully obtuse European capitals were about the extremely obvious Russian invasion buildup last winter, it seems likely that many countries might similarly try to ignore the signs of a Chinese invasion buildup and then use Taiwan’s complex political status as a justification for inaction. There’s a very real chance, therefore, that the US would have fairly little support if it were to choose to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf.
Operational Considerations
Despite its enormous conventional superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan, the PLA faces major operational challenges. Perhaps most obvious is the tradeoff it will face between maintaining ambiguity and surprise and initiating large-scale mobilization and stop-loss efforts. Given how totally Russia screwed up its invasion by failing to prepare for a serious war, it seems unlikely that Beijing will make the same mistake. But as a consequence, the PLA will have to telegraph its intentions many months in advance. Again, though, given how naively stupid some analysts were in their reading of Russian behavior, China just might be able to maintain sufficient ambiguity to retain at least some degree of operational surprise.
Speaking of maintaining ambiguity, one thing that has become increasingly clear is the importance of influence operations. Ukraine has done a terrific job of exploiting social media to win popular support for its cause abroad, and this has no doubt helped it apply pressure on reluctant European countries who otherwise may have sought to slow-walk the delivery of military aid even more than they did. But Russia has also conducted information warfare, spreading false rumors of American bioweapons labs in Ukraine and working to win support for its actions in non-Western countries. The question, then, is whether Taiwan or China will be better placed to control the narrative, both in the leadup to an invasion and during an actual conflict. My hunch is that Taiwan, with its highly open culture and deep digital integration will have an advantage, especially because Chinese influence operations historically have been quite ham-fisted (at least when compared to Russia). But both sides will no doubt be contesting the information space, and it’s important that countries have strategies in place to deal with the deluge of misinformation the conflict is likely to generate.
Like the bullet points Sam.